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There is the lack of consensus about the effect of corruption on healthcare satisfaction in transitional
countries. Interpreting the burgeoning literature on this topic has proven difﬁcult due to reverse cau-
sality and omitted variable bias. In this study, the effect of corruption on healthcare satisfaction is
investigated in a set of 12 Post-Socialist countries using instrumental variable regression on the sample
of 2010 Life in Transition survey (N ¼ 8655). The results indicate that experiencing corruption signiﬁ-
cantly reduces healthcare satisfaction.
© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to explore the effect of corruption
on healthcare satisfaction in Post-Socialist countries. On one end of
the equation, customer satisfactionwith healthcare is recognized as
a crucial component of healthcare delivery by governments,
healthcare authorities practitioners, and patients worldwide
(Smith et al., 2006; Kimenyi and Shughart II, 2006; Kettl et al.,
2006; Amponsah-Nketiah and Hiemenz, 2009). Feedback from
customers provides an important impetus to improving healthcare
delivery (Qatari and Haran, 1999; Bara et al., 2002; Brinkerhoff and
Wetterberg, 2013). Satisﬁed customers are more likely to develop
long-lasting relationship with healthcare providers and demon-
strate higher level of compliance, which ultimately leads to better
health outcomes (Margolis et al., 2003; Bleich et al., 2009; Njong
and Tchouapi, 2014).
On the other side of equation, corruption in healthcare exists as
a rampant issue in Post-Socialist countries (Bonilla-Chacin et al.,
2005; Falkingham et al., 2010). The literature notably lacks
consensus regarding the effect of corruption in developing and
transitional countries in general, and in healthcare in particular.
One school of thought conceptualises corruption as “sand thetd. This is an open access article uwheels” and suggests a negative effect of corruption (Clausen et al.,
2011). Indeed, previous studies on healthcare in transitional
countries support this view. Corruption, encompassing unofﬁcial
out-of-pocket payments and gifts, is associated with lower pro-
pensity of using healthcare when needed (Balabanova et al., 2004;
Falkingham, 2004; Fan and Habibov, 2009). Bribes often constitute
catastrophic expenditures for the poor (Habibov, 2009a, 2011). Due
to corruption barriers, more advanced and specialized health ser-
vices remain out of reach for the poor (Habibov, 2009b, 2010).
Conceptualizing corruption as “sand the wheel” postulates that we
should expect the effect of corruption on healthcare satisfaction.
The opposite school of thought conceptualises corruption as
“grease in the wheels” and highlights the positive outcomes of
corruption (Meon and Weill, 2010). First, corruption alleviates in-
efﬁciencies of administering public healthcare in transitional
period. Healthcare professionals consider their remuneration low
and expect informal payments, while patients expect that they
would have to pay out-of-pocket to underpaid professionals for
additional or better quality services (Gaal and McKee, 2004; Vian
and Burak, 2006). When expectations of healthcare professionals
and patients match, then a transaction of paying and receiving
unofﬁcial payments takes place. Corruption also introduces re-
distribution towards the poor. A number of previous studies
report that healthcare professionals charge a lower out-of-pocket
rate or even provide free care to citizens struggling with poverty,nder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Yes %)
Outcome
Satisfaction with healthcare 3.252 1.066 1 5
Predictor
Experienced corruption in healthcare 0.005 0 1 37%
Controls
Healthcare service quality 3.959 1.202 0 5
Poor health 0.37 0 1 16%
Age 43.658 17.024 17 93
Female 0.005 0 1 66%
University 0.005 0 1 25%
Middle wealth households 0.005 0 1 30%
Wealthiest households 0.005 0 1 31%
Work 0.005 0 1 49%
Instruments
Ask for interference 0.004 0 1 12%
Frequency of public service utilization 2.201 1.155 1 8
N. Habibov / Social Science & Medicine 152 (2016) 119e124120compensating the “lost” revenue by asking wealthier patients for
higher payments (Ensor and Savelyeva, 1998; Belli et al., 2004;
Gotsadze et al., 2005). In addition, corruption encourages compe-
tition. Individuals may pay bribes to receive necessary treatment
“free” in public healthcare rather than to pay ofﬁcially more for the
same treatment in private facilities (Rose, 1998). Conceptualizing
corruption as “grease the wheels” postulates that we should expect
effect of healthcare satisfaction on corruption.
Yet, another school of thought considers corruption a cultural
norm (Turex, 2011; Wang-Sheng and Guven, 2013). Thus, although
large-scale corruption schemes are commonly denounced, out-of-
pocket payments to healthcare professionals are not considered
an act of corruption (Bowser, 2001). Conceptualising corruption as a
harmless cultural norm suggests that there is no statistically sig-
niﬁcant association between corruption and satisfaction in either
direction.
Given the lack of consensus about the effect of corruption on
healthcare satisfaction, we focus on testing the above-describe
three hypotheses on a diverse sample of 12 Post-block countries.
We use classic single-stage linear OLS regression to test whether
healthcare corruption is a cultural norm, and examine if it has a
statistically signiﬁcant link with satisfaction. If OLS identiﬁes such a
link, then we can reject conceptualization of corruption as a cul-
tural norm. However, results of single-stage models like OLS are
prone to endogeneity, namely, reverse causality and omitted vari-
able bias. OLS cannot rule out reverse causality. For instance, it is
plausible to assume that clients satisﬁed with the higher level of
healthcare service pay extra or give gifts to healthcare personnel,
supporting “grease the wheels” conceptualization (Rose, 1998; Gaal
and McKee, 2004; Vian and Burak, 2006; Habibov, 2010). It is also
plausible that OLS estimation can suffer from uncontrolled
confounder variable that affect both corruption and satisfaction
leading to omitted variable bias. Consequently, we estimate and
rigorously test two-stage 2SLS regression which addresses both
reverse causality and omitted variable bias (Wooldridge, 2008). If
2SLS reports negative association between corruption and satis-
faction, then we can reject the “grease the wheels” conceptualiza-
tion of corruption in favour of the “sands the wheels”. An excellent
discussion of employing 2SLS to address reverse causality and
omitted variable bias in healthcare studies is provided by Kim et al.
(2011). To the best of our knowledge, our study is the ﬁrst one to
apply 2SLS to test three different conceptualisations of corruption
and to establish causal association between corruption and
healthcare satisfaction.
Let us now turn to method section.
2. Method
We used data from the Life-In-Transition survey (the LITS),
which was conducted in 2011 by European Bank of Reconstruction
and Development in cooperation with the World Bank (EBRD,
2009; Habibov, 2013). Our sample covers Post-Socialist Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,
Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Approxi-
mately 1000 respondents in non-institutionalized populations
were interviewed face-by-face in each country by especially trained
interviewers. However, since our focus is on healthcare satisfaction,
our sample is limited to the respondents who reported using public
healthcare within the last 12 months.
The LITS uses a clustered sampling design. According to LITS
manual (Ipsos, 2011), communities are clusters with clearly deﬁned
borders (e.g. census enumeration areas or voting districts) based on
the most recent national censuses or election lists (CITE). Clusters
are selected for the survey based on the probability proportional to
size. Each country included approximately 50e70 clustersdepending on the geographical and population size. Within the
clusters, a random walk ﬁeldwork method was employed select a
household for the interview. Maximum of 20 households were
selected randomly for the interview in each cluster. Finally, within
the households, the “last birthday” method was employed to select
the respondent for the interview. Replacement was not allowed to
avoid selection bias. The Research Ethics Board of University of
Windsor does not require ethical approval for secondary data
analysis.
2.1. Outcome, predictor, and controls
Our outcome variable is satisfaction with healthcare. The LITS
asked respondents to rate their satisfaction with the quality and
efﬁciency of the public healthcare system. Satisfaction is measured
on ﬁve-point ordinal scale, ranging from “very unsatisﬁed” to “very
satisﬁed”. Satisfaction is treated as continuous measure across all
estimations (Kim et al., 2011). Our predictor variable is corruption
in healthcare. The LITS asked whether an unofﬁcial payment was
made or gift was given to public healthcare personnel in the last 12
months. The responses are binomial (Yes ¼ 1, No ¼ 0).
Socio-demographics are controlled by age, gender, and educa-
tion of respondent. Healthcare quality is controlled by the index of
healthcare quality. The LITS asked respondents a set of question
regarding problems theymay have encountered in healthcare, such
as frequent and unjustiﬁed absence of doctors, treated disrespect-
fully by personnel, availability of medication, long waiting times,
and unclean facilities. The responses are binomial (no such a
problem ¼ 1, otherwise ¼ 0). Summing up these binomial answers,
we created an additive index varying from 0 to 5, where a higher
index value represents higher quality of healthcare received. To
control for needs for healthcare, we use a binomial variable of poor
health status, where value of 1 denotes a respondent who reported
poor or very poor health. Tertiles of wealth index represent middle
33.3% and wealthiest 33.3% of households in each country (Filmer
and Pritchett, 2001). Descriptive statistics is reported in Table 1.
2.2. Analysis
We commence by using OLS, where the outcome variable is
satisfaction with healthcare, the predictor variable is corruption in
healthcare with individual-level controls are as discussed above.
Next, we estimate a 2SLS model. In the ﬁrst-stage, corruption is
regressed on two instruments and covariates, including ﬁxed ef-
fects. In the second-stage, healthcare satisfaction is regressed on
the predicted value of corruption from the ﬁrst stage and
Fig. 1. Plot of satisfaction with healthcare against percentage of respondents reporting
corruption.
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interference” and “Frequency of public service utilization”, are used
in the 2SLS model. Usage of these instruments is supported by both
theoretical and empirical considerations.
The existing literature suggest that individuals predisposed to
bending rules have less ethical impediment to corruption, even
having a higher propensity to accept and be involved in corruption
in general (Lavallee et al., 2008; Cho and Kirwin, 2007). The LITS
asks how likely respondents are to ask friends, relatives, and
classmates to help to resolve various problems, such as receiving
permits and other ofﬁcial documents or receiving acceptance to
university. The responses of “likely” and “very likely”were added to
create the binomial instrument “Ask for interference,” where value
of 1 denotes higher propensity for breaking the rules by an indi-
vidual. The existing literature suggests that toleration of corruption
is associated with frequency of public service unitization (Grosjean
et al., 2013). The LITS asks whether respondents utilized various
public services, for instance, public primary and secondary educa-
tion, public vocational education, social services, the courts for civil
matters, and road police for the last 12 months. Positive responses
were tallied to compute the continuous instrument “Frequency of
public service utilization,” where the value of the variable varies
between 0 and 8, where a higher number represents more frequent
public service utilization.
The estimation of 2SLS requires instruments, which must be
correlated with a predictor. To test this assumption, we estimate
the ﬁrst stage F statistic that is 34.41, p ¼ 0.000. The F statistics is
signiﬁcant and higher than 10, signalling that jointly our in-
struments are correlated with the predictor (Stock and Yogo, 2002).
Likewise, minimum eigenvalue statistic is 37.07, which is higher
than Stock and Yogo's critical values of 19.93, suggesting that our
instruments are not weak (Stock et al., 2002; Stock and Yogo, 2005).
Since we have two instruments for one predictor, we used a like-
lihood ratio test to assess redundancy of each instrument (Baum,
2006). The results of the test are consistently signiﬁcant, suggest-
ing that both instruments provide useful information to identify
the ﬁrst stage equation.
At the same time, the instruments should not be correlated with
the outcome variable other than through their effect on the pre-
dictor. To test this assumption, we perform Wooldridge's (1995)
score test of overidentifying restrictions that is analog of Sargan
test for clustered data. Non-signiﬁcant results of these tests suggest
that the instruments are jointly uncorrelated with the outcome
variable. We also compute Pearson correlation between each in-
strument and outcome variable. The correlation between each in-
strument individually and outcome variable is negligible,
speciﬁcally, r ¼ 0.04 for “Ask for interference” instrument and
r ¼ 0.08 for “Frequency of public service utilization” instrument.
In addition, C statistics for each instrument in both models is not
signiﬁcant, suggesting that each of the instruments individually is
exogenous (Baum, 2006).
Finally, to test the endogeneity, we estimated Wooldridge's
(1995) regression-based tests of endogeneity which are analog for
DurbineWu-Hausman test for clustered data. Signiﬁcant results of
the test conﬁrms that experienced corruption index is endogenous.
Consequently, 2SLS should be estimated instead of single-stage
OLS.
2.3. Findings
To better understand the relation between corruption and
healthcare satisfaction we plot them against each other in Fig. 1. As
observed, corruption correlatedwith lower level of satisfaction. The
visual correlation is supported by the Pearson correlation
(r ¼ 0.53) and Spearman correlation (r ¼ 0.52).The results of one stage OLS are reported in ﬁrst column of
Table 2. Corruption in public healthcare leads to signiﬁcant reduc-
tion in satisfaction by a factor of 0.46. Reporting poorer health
status is associated with reduction in satisfaction, while an
improvement in quality of healthcare has opposite effect. Other
covariates are not signiﬁcant.
The results of the main stage of 2SLS with instruments “Ask for
interference” and “Frequency of public service utilization” are re-
ported in Model 2 in Panel A of Table 2. After taking into account
endogeneity, corruption has a negative effect on health satisfaction
by a factor of1.26. The results for the covariates are very similar to
the results of OLS without any systematic differences in sign and
magnitude. Comparing 2SLS and OLS, we can see that the simple
one-stage OLS has considerably underestimated the negative effect
of corruption on satisfaction. Once endogeneity is taken into ac-
count by the 2SLS, the magnitude of the negative corruption effect
considerably increases. The 2SLS indicates a negative effect by a
factor of 1.26, while OLS indicates a negative effect by a factor
of 0.46, which translates to approximately 2.7 times the differ-
ence between the estimates. This ﬁnding suggests a strong endo-
geneity bias in corruption.
Another way to interpret results of 2SLS is to compare the co-
efﬁcient for corruption effect with the raw mean for satisfaction of
3.25 which is reported in Table 1. The results of model 2 indicate
that experiencing corruption reduces satisfaction by approximately
38% of the raw mean, while the results of model 3 suggest that
corruption reduces satisfaction by approximately 36% of the raw
mean.
The result of the ﬁrst stage of 2SLS is reported in Panel B of
Table 2. All instruments are signiﬁcant and correlated with the
endogenous variable of interest in the expected direction. Thus, as
it could be expected asking for interference and frequency of public
service utilization are associated with more corruption.
2.4. Sensitivity analysis
We test sensitivity of the 2SLS models in twoways. First, we test
whether healthcare quality may have mediating, rather than
moderating relationship between making unofﬁcial payments and
satisfaction with healthcare, since individuals who make such
payments may receive higher quality of care and ultimately report
greater satisfaction. Hence, we re-estimated models 2 without
healthcare quality. The results are reported in model 3. As shown,
Table 2
Results of regression analysis.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
Panel A: Results of OLS and main stage of 2SLS
Experienced corruption in healthcare 0.461 0.000 1.266 0.000 1.820 0.000 1.220 0.000
0.026) 0.280) 0.239) 0.277)
Healthcare service quality 0.278 0.000 0.207 0.000 0.211 0.000
0.010) 0.027) 0.027)
Poor health 0.219 0.000 0.202 0.000 0.239 0.000 0.206 0.000
0.033) 0.035) 0.040) 0.035)
Age 0.001 0.069 0.000 0.856 0.000 0.808 0.000 0.937
0.001) 0.001) 0.001) 0.001)
Women 0.019 0.391 0.009 0.690 0.002 0.952 0.008 0.743
0.022) 0.024) 0.026) 0.024)
University 0.005 0.842 0.003 0.908 0.010 0.734 0.011 0.67
0.026) 0.027) 0.031) 0.026)
Middle wealth households 0.037 0.149 0.036 0.197 0.046 0.139
0.026) 0.028) 0.031)




Community dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 8494 8494 8494 8494
F statistics 28.5 0.000
Wald chi2 2026.54 0.000 763.20 0.000 2054.65 0.000
R-squared 0.22 0.12 N.A. 0.13
First-stage regression summary statistics
Robust F 34.41 0.000 55.21 0.000 34.72 0.000
Minimum eigenvalue statistic 37.07 59.56 37.26
Stock and Yogo's critical value 19.93 19.93 19.93
LM test for redundancy of Ask for interference instrument 14.50 0.000 17.46 0.000 14.37 0.000
LM test for redundancy of Frequency of public service utilization instrument 56.23 0.000 95.96 0.000 56.85 0.000
Test of overidentifying restrictions:
Score chi2 0.02 0.875 0.11 0.739 0.05 0.829
C statistic for of Ask for interference instrument 0.03 0.869 0.12 0.726 0.05 0.821
C statistic for of Frequency of public service utilization instrument 0.03 0.869 0.12 0.726 0.05 0.821
Tests of endogeneity
Robust score chi2 9.18 0.003 31.05 0.000 8.25 0.004
Robust regression F 9.14 0.003 31.26 0.000 8.21 0.004
Panel B: Result of ﬁrst-stage of 2SLS
Ask for interference 0.054 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.054 0.000
0.015) 0.016) 0.015)
Frequency of public service utilization 0.032 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.032 0.000
0.004) 0.005) 0.004)
Healthcare service quality 0.084 0.000 0.084 0.000
0.004) 0.004)
Poor health 0.025 0.070 0.052 0.000 0.028 0.046
0.014) 0.014) 0.014)
Age 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.005
0.000) 0.000) 0.000)
Women 0.010 0.317 0.009 0.398 0.007 0.484
0.010) 0.010) 0.010)
University 0.009 0.440 0.018 0.113 0.007 0.550
0.011) 0.012) 0.011)
Middle wealth households 0.003 0.818 0.001 0.900
0.012) 0.012)




Community dummies included Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 8494 8494 8494
F statistics 40.70 0.000 32.74 0.000 41.12 0.000
R-squared 0.24 0.20 0.24
Note. Robust standard errors are in brackets.
N. Habibov / Social Science & Medicine 152 (2016) 119e124122the direction and signiﬁcance of corruption effect in models 2 is
similar to those in models 3. The magnitude of the effect, however,
is higher when we drop healthcare quality. For instance, effect of
corruption without taking into consideration effect of quality in
model 3 is approximately 43% more negative than in model 2 withhealthcare quality as a control. It appears that healthcare quality
plays moderating rather than mediating role between making un-
ofﬁcial payments and satisfaction with healthcare and hence
should be controlled for.
Second, the question could be asked whether individuals in the
N. Habibov / Social Science & Medicine 152 (2016) 119e124 123wealthiest tertile in a poor country (e.g. Tajikistan) are actually
richer than individuals in the second or even the last tertile in a
wealthier country (e.g. Hungary). Consequently, we test weather
changing welfare tertiles for a being employed may signiﬁcantly
alter the results. The binomial variable employed has value of 1 if
respondents reported to work for income in last 12 months. We re-
estimated models 2 with employment status instead of tertiles of
wealth. The results reported in models 4. Again, the direction and
signiﬁcance are similar to our original 2SLS models. The negative
effect of corruption inmodels 2 is1.26 which is similar to1.22 in
model 4.
All other covariates in sensitivity analysis models are similar to
those in models 2, 3, and 4. Importantly, all models in sensitivity
analysis passed all required instrumental variable tests.2.5. Simulated effect of corruption
Based on the 2SLS results inmodels 2, we can simulate the effect
of corruption on satisfaction with healthcare by predicting the
average satisfaction for every individual in the sample depending
on corruption. The results of simulation are reported in Table 3. The
ﬁrst row of the table shows the average raw mean of 3.25. The next
row shows the mean of satisfaction assuming every respondent
reported experiencing corruption. Experiencing corruption by
everyone would reduce mean satisfaction to 2.45, which consti-
tutes 76% of the raw mean. By contrast, the last row shows the
mean assuming no respondents reported experiencing corruption.
Having no reported corruption would boost mean satisfaction to
3.72, which is 14% higher than the raw mean.2.6. Discussion, implications, and limitations
There is the lack of consensus about the effect of corruption on
healthcare satisfaction in transitional countries. Interpreting the
burgeoning literature on this topic is difﬁcult due to reverse cau-
sality and omitted variable bias. In this study, we test “grease the
wheels”, “sand in the wheels”, and “cultural norm” hypotheses
about possible effect of corruption on healthcare satisfaction.
The results of OLS suggest that corruption is associated with
signiﬁcant reduction in healthcare satisfaction. The result of 2SLS,
which was estimated to address reverse causality and omitted
variable bias, provides qualitatively similar results. Likewise,
simulation results demonstrate that reducing corruption will
considerably increase healthcare satisfaction. Importantly, these
results are stable when controlled for alternative explanations of
healthcare satisfaction such as, quality of care received, and health
and wealth statuses.
These ﬁndings have both theoretical and practical signiﬁcance.
From a theoretical perspective, our ﬁndings reject the notion of
corruption as “grease in thewheels” and a “cultural norm” in favour
of the “sand in the wheels” hypothesis inasmuch as we found
signiﬁcantly negative effects of corruption on satisfaction. FromTable 3
Results of simulation.
Scenario Mean of satisfaction with healthcare
Raw sample mean 3.25***
0.007)
Everyone experienced corruption 2.45***
0.003)
No one experienced corruption 3.72***
0.003)
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01,
***p < 0.001.practical perspective, our ﬁndings highlight the importance of
reducing corruption in healthcare. One way to reduce corruption is
to legitimize informal payments in the framework of broader re-
forms of healthcare sector in transitional countries. The different
approaches to such legitimizations are currently being discussed
(e.g. Gaal and McKee, 2004; Falkingham et al., 2010; WHO, 2015).
Another method is a step-up enforcement and to enhance trans-
parency by joining international initiatives in healthcare reform
(Vian, 2008). In any case, given the strong negative effect of cor-
ruption on satisfaction identiﬁed by this study, the public health
gains from containing and reducing corruption is to be signiﬁcant.
Our study is not without limitations. First, since we used sec-
ondary data survey, our deﬁnition of corruption is limited to petty
corruption, rather than large-scale corruption schemes. At the same
time, measures of corruption and healthcare satisfaction were not
validated across countries. Besides, corruption is viewed from the
customer perspective rather that from the perspective of other
agents, for instance, healthcare personnel and government regu-
lators. Likewise, we could not differentiate between beneﬁciaries of
corruption among healthcare personnel and reasons for paying
bribes.
In addition, although we found no empirical evidence for direct
effect of the instrumental variables on outcome variable in our
main model and sensitivity analysis models, nevertheless, such
direct effect of our instruments could not be ruled out completely.
Finally, the omitted community-level factors, for instance,
community-level spending per capita on education, infrastructure,
and indeed on health care, may vary over time and be potentially
correlatedwith the utilization of public services. Equally, we cannot
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